Sunday, February 24, 2013

Sunday, February 17, 2013

An unexpected weekend project that went very well.

We all have these unexpected projects. This week I was given a surveillance DVR that had seen better days. The primary hard disk had spun a bearing (hehe). It was a system I built a number of years ago for my family. Previously I used the software that came with the capture card, a generic 4 channel bt878 card. The software ran on Windows XP so from the start I never really expected anything long lasting although it did last about 5 years.

Anyways, enough about what it was. I dug up a 4Gb USB flash drive, installed a very basic CenOS 6 install, got x264, FFmpeg, ZoneMinder, MySQL, PHP and Apache and made it a reliable surveillance server now. It does have a 1Tb drive for the video.

I have to say the ZoneMinder software is not anything fancy by first appearance but supports all the features that most expensive commercial solutions offer. I like that it did not require me to install any GUI environment on the device itself. No resources wasted on this build.

[root@cam ~]# uptime
 11:09:56 up 1 day, 23:04,  2 users,  load average: 0.00, 0.18, 0.22
[root@cam ~]# ps ax | grep zm[ac]
12795 ?        S      0:04 /usr/bin/perl -wT /usr/local/bin/ -c
12931 ?        S     46:47 /usr/local/bin/zmc -d /dev/video0
16011 ?        S    131:08 /usr/local/bin/zma -m 5
16192 ?        S     35:39 /usr/local/bin/zmc -d /dev/video1
16204 ?        S    126:37 /usr/local/bin/zma -m 6
16231 ?        S     35:32 /usr/local/bin/zmc -d /dev/video2
16243 ?        S    120:07 /usr/local/bin/zma -m 7
16309 ?        S     34:22 /usr/local/bin/zmc -d /dev/video3
16321 ?        S    128:12 /usr/local/bin/zma -m 8

 Not bad for an old Pentium E5200 with 2Gb.


Sunday, February 10, 2013

Malware Analysis 101 [Part 2]

Now that we've covered the different classifications of the functionality of malicious software, made the distinction between targeting vectors, and summarized how IDS/IPS devices fit into the scheme, its time to move into analysis of malware. In case you missed it, Part 1 can be located here.

Image Source

Generally, analysis of any sample can be broken down into two categories, static and dynamic which further subdivide into basic and advanced:

  • Static
    • Basic - Examine an executable without viewing instructions.
    • Advanced - Code analysis using disassembly tools to view Op Code.
  • Dynamic
    • Basic - Behavioral observation [Sandboxing].
    • Advanced - Code analysis using a debugger to manually control the flow of the program. This technique is used to understand the more complex aspects of a sample which static code analysis may be unable to provide.
Each of the above techniques can be utilized in synchronicity of one another in order to reveal different pieces of information about a piece of software. The goal of analysis is to take these many small pieces of information from multiple sources and form a picture of the nature of the sample.

Basic Static Analysis:

From here on, it is assumed that a sample is readily apparent and available. Finding malware is a whole different can of worms, and a worthy topic for a separate blog post series (maybe in the future). 

With a sample provided, one of the first things that can be done is AntiVirus scanning. The key is to use multiple programs and resources as this increases signature coverage. Siganture variations make a substantial difference in the rate of detection. Fortunately, instead of buying 8-10 host based antivirus products (and pitting them against each other on the same local machine) along with their accompanying subscriptions, several free web services exist which will scan a submitted sample against multiple Antivirus engines. These engines include both signature based detection and heuristic based detection. The most common/popular/wellknown example is, of course, (which has register free, public, and private API functionality).

Before moving on, a word about the inherent weaknesses of Antivirus software. The two types of detection mechanisms, signature based and heuristic based, have a number of shortcomings. Simple code modifications easily bypass signature based detection, and in this era of updatable malware through network (command and control) communications, the cat and mouse game has become even more fast paced. Heuristic engines have a similar weakness: they can be completely bypassed with new or unusual code. If there is no record to compare a sample against, it is impossible for a heuristic engine to categorize.

Image Source
The image to the right was generated by using VirusTotal's main page to submit a binary retrieved from a domain listed on This file is categorized as a generic password stealer, which slots nicely into the "Infostealer" category defined in part 1 of this series. Interesting note: 9/42 AV products detected this sample as malicious, although the ones that did identifity the sample, categorized it similarly [this suggests a commonality amongst their signature designs]. The grey window shows PE32 structural information, which is something we will examine a little later. Sites like VirusTotal and AntiVirus products as a whole are not withoiut their faults: benign files can and oftentimes do trigger alerts [Example being unebootin, packed with UPX which appears suspicious, and does trigger some alerts]. Thus, solely relying on multi-scanner service like this is not going to provide enough information to make an informed decision about the overall nature of a sample. Use the information gained from services like VirusTotal or NoVirusThanks to inform your decisions, not make them for you!

Image Source

Sandboxing is a basic, dynamic analysis technique in which a sample is run in an isolated environment: the goal being to "box off" potentially malicious activity from harming a local machine. This is generally achieved through virtualization ex: Cuckoo Sandbox. Sandboxes attempt to mimic common network services in order to monitor the behavior of malware when provided network connectivity. Like antivirus services, there are a number of free, web-based services that provide this functionality if one does not have the means to setup a local environment. By far the most popular is ThreatExpert. ThreatExpert performs automated analysis, and is generally very useful in initial reporting.

Automated sandbox analysis is not without its drawbacks and frequently will fail to give any meaningful output. Some of the issues are as follows:
1) Any sample that requires command line options will not be analyzed appropriately as an automated environment has no way to pass arguments via command line in the course of executing a piece of software.
2) Though network services are simulated, command and control traffic is not. Malware this is reliant on instructions from a remote host may never execute, leaving automated analysis useless.

Provided the sandbox is able to execute the provided sample, a report containing system changes, network connectivity, and basic functionality if generated. ThreatExpert has the added ability to identify some malwre through AV scans, but this functionality overlaps with services previously mentioned. Like the multi-engine antivirus services  the results of automated analysis should not be taken as definitive: the goal of sandboxing is to provide insight into the ways in which a sample may attempt to manipulate a host.

Report Source
Here is an example report for a sample submitted to ThreatExpert in 2010. Though 2010 may be a reltively ancient date at this point, it is a good demonstration of information provided by ThreatExpert post-analysis.  You can see basic summary information of the submitted sample including hash, file size  Aliases as identified by AV products and Time/Date Submitted. Of more interest is the "What's Been Found Field" which summarizes the activity which took place during the run time in an easily readable and understandable form. This information is very useful for understanding the capabilities of a sample, and can provide some insight into the Function Calls that you may see further along in the analysis process. The next section contains File System changes: files added, removed and modified and their names + directories, potentially useful for signature development or manual removal. The final section of note is the Network activity summary. Here you can see that a file was downloaded, potentially provided yet another sample for analysis in the future. You may also be able to infer that the sample submitted has some downloader Trojan Functionality, and is likely to making Windows API calls in order to download this file.

Stay Tuned for Part 3!
[Hashing, PE Headers, Linked Libraries and Functions!]

Friday, February 8, 2013

Newest contributer to this blog

Hello followers. I am a new edition to this blog. My topics will be far and wide due to that being the focus of my interests.

My current project is porting ArchLinux to my newest embedded device, the oDroid. I have a Raspberry Pi, I wanted something with a bit more processing capabilities and discovered the oDroid. Great device.

The status of this project is, as far as I can tell the system is running but no video output from the HDMI output (framebuffer only). I have a 1.7v UART adapter on the way so that I can get the console up and figure out the video issue.

As of last night I've completed setting up a VM on my server that is dedicated to distcc (distributed c compiler) to assist in compiling software on the oDroid. Not that the oDroid is slow but just because time is progress.

In case you've not seen the oDroid, it packs a Cortex A9 quad-core ARM7 at 1.7GHz, 2Gb memory and Mali-400 GPU. A couple other things that make this stand out compared to the RPi is that this has 6xUSB, Audio in, 8-bit eMMC memory option and then a category 10 SD reader. I did spring for the 16Gb eMMC option.

I now have the eMMC running Android on it, one SD card with my ArchLinux progress and a second SD card with Ubuntu. I did manage to get GNUradio compiled under Ubuntu and have been using it with a RTL-SDR receiver.


Wednesday, February 6, 2013

Malware Analysis 101 [Part 1]

Back in July of 2012 at the Rhode Island OWASP and again in September of 2012 at "The Brain Tank", I was fortunate enough to be allocated 50 minutes during which to speak about a sort of side hobby that overlaps into my normal workflow. Its a topic that really inspired me to look into the Info-Sec industry as a career: that topic is Malware. I find evil things highly entertaining, and what is more sinister than malicious software?

The goal of my original presentation was to provide an overview of basic techniques I use on a daily basis in order to inform my decision making process. Within 15 minutes of receiving a sample (regardless of the form it arrives in!) an analyst needs to be able to determine what action to take. The desired outcome is to categorize the sample as:
1) Benign
2) Suspicious
3) Malicious
With that in mind, I am going to go ahead and skip the first 2 slides, which consisted of an Introduction and an About Me section, and hop right into the meat of my presentation. 

Note: Some of my slides contain 3rd party graphics or images. These will all be linked below the image of the slide.